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GEOENGINEERING AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
THE SEARCH FOR COMMON LEGAL GROUND

Ralph Bodle*
INTRODUCTION
Given that it is a relatively new concept covering a broad range of activities, it is
no surprise that, as of yet, no internationally binding rules exist specifically on
geoengineering. However, there are particular areas of international law that would
arguably apply to particular geoengineering concepts: Space law could apply to sundeflecting mirrors in space, legal regimes such as the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS")' or the London Convention/London Protocol ("LC/LP") 2
to ocean fertilization, and air pollution treaties to stratospheric sulphur injection. 3 Carbon
capture and storage and ocean fertilization in particular have been the subject of
considerable debate and rule-making by the LC/LP and the Convention on Biological
Diversity ("CBD") 4 treaty bodies. Ocean fertilization is one geoengineering concept that
has been tested in a field experiment of a more than negligible scale. It sparked not only
public debate but also intensified efforts to address geoengineering at an international
regulatory level. In October 2010, the CBD Conference of the Parties 10 ("COPl0")
adopted a decision which, for the first time at this level, addressed geoengineering in
general and which some regard as a ban or "de facto moratorium." 5

* Dr. Ralph Bodle LL.M. is Senior Fellow and Coordinator Legal Studies, Ecologic Institute, Berlin. The
author would like to thank Clare Hamilton and Harald Ginzky for debate and thoughts. This article was written
with support from the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research under the "Social Ecological
Research" Framework Programme.
1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 12, 1982, 21 L.L.M. 1261 (1982); G.A. Res.
48/263, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/263 (Aug. 17, 1994).
2. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, opened for
signature Dec. 29, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1294 (1972); 1996 Protocol to the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, Nov. 7, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 4 (1997) [hereinafter
London Protocol].
3. See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, May We Engineer the Climate?, 33 CLIMATIC CHANGE 309, 314 (1996);
Rex J. Zedalis, Climate Change and the National Academy of Sciences' Idea of Geoengineering: One
American Academic's Perspective on FirstConsideringthe Text ofExisting InternationalAgreements, 19 EUR.
ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 18-32 (Feb. 2010). On the law of the sea and UNCLOS, see Karen N. Scott, Marine
Geo-engineering:A New Challengefor the Law of the Sea, ANZSIL 18TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE (JUNE 24-26,
at
available
2010),
http://ir.canterbury.ac.nz/bitstream/10092/4878/1/12626851 K%2OScott/o20Marine%20Geoengineering%20%20A%20New%2OChallenge%20for%/o2Othe%20Law%/o20of/2Othe%2OSea.pdf.
4. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Convention on Biological Diversity,
June 5, 1992, 31 1.L.M. 818 (1992) [hereinafter Convention on Biological Diversity].
5. Cf Juliet Eilperin, GeoengineeringSparks InternationalBan, First-Ever CongressionalReport, WASH.
POST, Oct. 30, 2010, at A-7; Great News: UN Agrees Moratorium on Geoengineering Experiments!!,
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Against this backdrop, the focus of this article is on overarching rules of
international law that are common legal ground and might apply to all concepts currently
discussed under the heading "geoengineering." In this context we analyze the legal
implications of the duty to respect the environment, the precautionary principle or
approach, and the duty to undertake an environmental impact assessment. In addition, the
article explores to what extent the Environmental Modification Convention
("ENMOD") 6 could be applicable or useful as a reference. Against this backdrop I also
analyze the recent decision by the CBD COP10.
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ALL GEOENGINEERING CONCEPTS

Prevention of TransboundaryHarm to the Environment
One of the cornerstones of international environmental law is the general
obligation of states to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control respect the
environment of other states or of areas beyond national control. Listed as Principle 2 of
the Rio Declaration, 7 the rule has become customary international law. 8 A state in breach
of this rule could be held responsible by other states under the customary rules of state
responsibility.9 This would entail legal obligations to cease the activity, to offer
appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances so require, and
to make full reparation for the injury caused. 10
In case of an alleged breach of the duty to respect the environment, establishing
responsibility of a state for geoengineering would require several elements. First, the
geoengineering activity must be attributable to the state in question. Second, the
activity's effects must be proven to have caused harm. Depending on the particular
geoengineering activity and its scale, attribution to a state is probably possible to a large
degree using global information systems and technology such as satellite observation.
However, it might be more difficult to establish the further requirement that the
particular geoengineering activity caused particular harm to the environment of other
states or of areas beyond national control. It might not be clear whether or to what extent
the geoengineering activity had an effect on the earth's albedo or reduced CO 2 in the

HANDSOFFMOTHEREARTH.ORG (Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.handsoffmotherearth.org/2010/10/great-news-unagrees-moratorium-on-geoengineering-experiments/.
6. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification
Techniques, Dec. 10, 1976, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151 [hereinafter ENMOD].
7. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, June 13, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 876 [hereinafter Rio Declaration]. Cf Principle 21 of the preceding
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, June 16, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1416.
8. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 1 29
(July 8); Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J., 7, 1 53 (Sept. 25); Pulp
Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 57, 1 193 (April 20), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/15877.pdf (Note that the I.C.J.'s formulation is "activities within their
jurisdiction and control.") (emphasis added).
9. As codified by the International Law Commission's Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, which for the most part reflect customary law. See G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/56/83, Annex (Jan. 28, 2002) [hereinafter Articles on State Responsibility]. The rules relied on in this
article are customary law, although some other concepts in the Articles on State Responsibility may not be
universally accepted.
10. Id. at arts. 30-31.
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atmosphere. In this context, depending on the geoengineering activity in question and the
scientific and statistical knowledge available, reversing the burden of proof could be
worth considering for geoengineering. Such a reversal has been argued on the basis of
the precautionary approach in the Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay case before the
International Court of Justice ("ICJ"). While the ICJ accepted that a precautionary
approach "may be relevant" in the interpretation and application of the treaty in question,
it also stated that "it does not follow that it operates as a reversal of the burden of
proof."' I The wording of the court was not clear as to whether this applies to the specific
case or generally excludes a reversal. If the burden of proof was reversed in a case of
alleged state responsibility for geoengineering, a state to whom a geoengineering activity
is attributable would have to rebut the presumption that the earth's albedo was changed
or its CO 2 reduced. However, it would still be difficult to establish that a particular
alleged harm to the environment was caused by these effects. For instance, alleged
environmental harm could include changes in precipitation patternsl2 followed by floods
or droughts. Potential claimant states would have to establish a causal link between the
particular geoengineering activity and changes in precipitation, as well as between those
changes in precipitation patterns and specific environmental harm. It remains to be seen
to what extent global observation and monitoring systems could play a role in this
respect. 13
The rules of state responsibility do not require fault or negligence of the state. The
conduct required or prohibited and the standards to be observed depend on the obligation
in question. The international obligation not to cause transboundary environmental harm
requires a due diligence standard. A state is therefore not in breach of this obligation
unless it fails in applying due diligence.14 Which diligence is "due" depends on the
circumstances of the particular case, which leaves considerable legal uncertainty. For
instance, the obligation not to cause transboundary environmental harm and the rules on
state responsibility do not distinguish between research and deployment. However,
international coordination could provide guidance regarding geoengineering and indicate
that research fulfilling certain criteria qualifies as due diligence. In addition,
geoengineering activities would need to be distinguished from activities that are accepted
although they also affect the earth's albedo or reduce CO 2 from the atmosphere.
Attempts at defining geoengineering use criteria such as whether the activity is deliberate
or whether it is merely part of a cumulative effect. 15
11. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay 1 164.
available at
System,
Climate
the
Geoengineering
on
Statement
Policy
12. AMS
(adopted by the American
http://www.ametsoc.org/policy/2009geoengineeringclimateamsstatement.html
Meteorological Society Council on July 20, 2009); Alan Robock et al., A Test for Geoengineering?, 327
Science 531 (January 2010).
13. For an early suggestion regarding responsibility for CO 2 emissions and weather modification, compare
Task Manager of the Comm'n on Sustainable Dev., Task Manager's Report on Decision-Making Structures:
InternationalLegal Instruments and Mechanisms, Comm'n on Sustainable Dev., 2d Sess., May 16-27, 1994,
para. 143, availableat http://www.un.org/gopher-data/esc/cnl7/1994/tmr/tmr-deci (May 16, 1994).
14. Cf Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 53rd Sess., Apr. 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, U.N. Doc.
A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001), available at http://un.org/documents/ga/docs/56/a5610.pdf;
id. at ch. IV, art. 3, para. 8.
15. See ROYAL SOc'Y, GEOENGINEERING THE CLIMATE: SCIENCE, GOVERNANCE AND UNCERTAINTY 1
(2009), available at http://www.royalsociety.org/geoengineering-the-climate/; Convention on Biological
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It would also be interesting to explore whether a state could avoid responsibility by
relying on necessity as one of the "circumstances precluding wrongfulness." 16 For
instance, a state causing transboundary environmental harm by geoengineering might
argue that it is particularly affected by climate change and claim distress or necessity as a
legal defense.
Further legal problems could ensue from emerging international principles
regarding harmful effects of "hazardous" acts, even where such acts are not in breach of
This could include making private actors liable under
an international obligation.
domestic law.18 Although neither of these rules actually prohibit geoengineering, they
could be of particular relevance in view of intended global and potentially irreversible
consequences.
These technical legal problems relating to potential responsibility of states are
beyond the scope of this paper. Generally, international law has difficulties making
individual states responsible for complex environmental effects. Although its existence
as part of customary law is important, the obligation to not cause transboundary
environmental harm has so far played a limited role in international environmental
disputes. 19 A recent case was brought in November 2010 when Ecuador instituted
proceedings at the ICJ against Colombia in relation to alleged damages caused to
Ecuador, its inhabitants, and the environment through the aerial spraying of chemical
herbicides at and over the border. Ecuador argues that Colombia violated Ecuador's
"rights under customary and conventional international law" and claims that Colombia
failed to meet its obligations of prevention and precaution.20
More fundamentally, the main problem with state responsibility in relation to
geoengineering is that it is retrospective and comes into play only after the
geoengineering activity has taken place. International law provides only very limited
means to obtain advance provisional measures in order to stop activities that could be in
breach of international obligations.21
Diversity Decision X/33, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/33, para. 8(w) (Oct. 29, 2010), available at
http://www.cbd.int/coplO/doc/ [all references to Convention on Biological Diversity Decisions are hereinafter
abbreviated as "CBD Decision"].
16. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 9, at art. 25.
17. See, e.g., the work of the ILC on DraftArticles on Prevention of TransboundaryHarm from Hazardous
Activities, in Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, supra note 14.
18. Cf Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising Out of
Hazardous Activities, Int'l Law Comm'n, 58th Sess., May 1-June 9, July 3-Aug. 11, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/61/10;
GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 10 (in particular, Principle 4.2).
19. Cf Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, paras. 27-33; GabdikovoNagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25).
20. Aerial Herbicide Spraying (Ecuador v. Colom.), Application by Ecuador, para. 37-38, (Mar. 31, 2008),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/138/14474.pdf. It remains to be seen to which extent
environmental obligations will play a role in this case.
21. In recent years the ICJ has granted only few applications for provisional measures. See LaGrand (Ger.
v. U.S.), Order, 1999 I.C.J. 9 (Mar. 3); Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Order, 2003 I.C.J.
77 (Feb. 5); Request for interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the case concerning the Temple of
Preah Vihear (Cam. v. Tha), Order of 18 July 2011, available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/151/16564.pdf; Certain Activities carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica
v. Nicaragua), Order of 8 March 2011, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/150/16324.pdf. All other
applications were rejected. See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002)
(Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), Order, 2002 I.C.J. 219 (July 10); Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Rep.
Congo v. Fr.), Order, 2003 I.C.J. 102 (June 17); Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Order, 2006
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PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE/APPROACH

Geoengineering, with its unclear yet potentially severe and irreversible
consequences, seems an ideal candidate to be addressed by the precautionary approach or
principle. However, it is not clear how the precautionary principle would apply to
geoengineering or what it would specifically require in legal terms.
The uncertainties begin with the legal status of the precautionary principle and the
terminology as to whether there is such a legal "principle" at all or merely an
"approach." 22 There is no uniform formulation or usage of the precautionary principle, 23
and its legal status in customary international law has not yet been clearly recognized, 24
although it has been invoked several times.25 Based on a distinction between "approach"
and "principle," the U.K. House of Commons Science and Technology Committee
recommended excluding the precautionary principle from a set of five key principles to
govern geoengineering. The Committee argued that restricting research on this basis
would lead to research being carried out elsewhere by other bodies or states not adhering
to common rules.26 However, in relation to geoengineering, the question of whether the

I.C.J. 113 (July 13); Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Order, 2007 1.C.J. 3 (Jan. 23); Questions
Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), Order, (May 28, 2009), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/144/15149.pdf; Press Release, I.C.J., Costa Rica Institutes Proceedings
Against Nicaragua and Requests the Court to Indicate Provisional Measures (Nov. 19, 2010), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/150/16239.pdf.
22. See generally PATRICIA W. BIRNIE, ALAN E. BOYLE & CATHERINE REDGWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE ENVIRONMENT, 152 (3d ed. 2009); SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, THE REGULATION OF

GEOENGINEERING (FIFTH REPT.), 2009-10, H.C. 221, para. 86 (U.K.). On the basis of the heading "Principles"
in Article 3.3 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, this article uses the term
"precautionary principle" without prejudice to this debate.
23. Cf Rio Declaration, supra note 7, at 879 (Principle 15); United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, art. 3(3), May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC]; London Protocol, supra
note 2, art. 3, at 9; Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 4, at 822 (Preamble); BIRNIE, BOYLE &
REDGWELL, supra note 22, at 160-61.
24. Cf John Virgoe, International Governance of a Possible Geoengineering Intervention to Combat
Climate Change, 95 CLIMATIC CHANGE 103, 111 (2009); SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, THE
REGULATION OF GEOENGINEERING, supra note 22, at paras. 85-86. Kerstin Giissow, Andreas Oschlies,
Alexander Proelss, Katrin Rehdanz, and Wilfried Rickels acknowledge a "considerable degree of unclarity as
to its normative content and validity," but apply principle 15 of the Rio Declaration without further analysis as
to legal status in Ocean Iron Fertilization:Why FurtherResearch is Needed 15 (Kiel Inst. for the World Econ.,
Working Paper No. 1574, 2009), available at http://www.ifw-members.ifw-kiel.de/publications/ocean-ironfertilization-why-further-research-is-needed/kwpl574.
25. In its judgment in The Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, the I.C.J. considered that
while a precautionary approach may be relevant in the interpretation and application of the provisions of the
treaty in question, it rejected Argentina's argument that it operates as a reversal of the burden of proof. See
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Ur.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 57, IT 160-68 (April 20) Memorial of
Argentina, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, 1 3.194-3.197, 5.15 (Jan. 15, 2007), availableat http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/135/15425.pdf. See also Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with
Paragraph 63 of the Court's Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.) Case, 1995 I.C.J.
288, IT 342, 412 (Sept. 22) (dissenting opinions of Judges Weeramantry and Palmer, respectively); Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, III.10.f (dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry);
Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), paras. 16, 120-25,
WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998); The Mox Plant Case (Ir. v. U.K.), Case No. 10, Order of Dec. 3, 2001
at
http://www.itlos.org/cgiavailable
Wolfrum),
Judge
Opinion
of
(Separate
bin/cases/case _detail.pl?id=10&lang-en#order; Simon Marr, The Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases: The
PrecautionaryApproach and Conservation and Management of Fish Resources, 11 Eu. J. OF INT'L LAW 815
(2000).
26. Based on the distinction between "approach" and "principle." See SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
COMMITTEE, THE REGULATION OF GEOENGINEERING, supra note 22, para. 86.
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precautionary principle is customary law is less relevant. As the purpose of
geoengineering is to address climate change, there is a clear legal basis for applying the
precautionary principle as stipulated under the heading "Principles" in Article 3(3) of the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ("UNFCCC").27 Almost all
states have ratified the UNFCCC,28 including the United States. 29
The first two sentences of Article 3(3) of the UNFCCC stipulate the precautionary
approach in the form of "should" obligations. The first sentence requires that Parties
actively take precautionary measures. It not only covers the causes of climate change, but
also explicitly includes mitigating its adverse effects. Proponents of geoengineering
could argue that geoengineering concepts for CO 2 removal are measures addressing the
cause of climate change 30 and that geoengineering concepts for solar radiation
management mitigate its adverse effects. The second sentence of Article 3(3) refers to
"such measures," for example, geoengineering measures considered on the basis of the
first sentence. "[L]ack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for
postponing such measures," provided there are "threats of serious or irreversible
damage." 31 Geoengineering proponents could argue that such threats exist, in view of the
slow decrease or continuing increase of greenhouse gas emissions, the slow pace of the
climate change negotiations, and the short remaining time period during which emission
trends need to be reversed (peaking). By this rationale, the lack of full scientific certainty
about geoengineering should not be a reason for postponing it. A safeguard is provided
by Article 4(1)(f) of the UNFCCC, which requires all parties to employ appropriate
methods "with a view to minimizing adverse effects" of their mitigation and adaptation
measures on the economy, public health, and the quality of the environment.32 Impact
assessments are explicitly mentioned as an example of such methods. However,
geoengineering would have to qualify as a mitigation or adaptation measure within the
scope of this provision.
Reading Article 3(3) of the UNFCCC this way in relation to geoengineering might
seem unexpected. At the time the UNFCCC was drafted, it was intended mainly to
prevent states from postponing mitigation measures by referring to scientific uncertainty
about climate change. However, the actual wording allows for the above interpretation in
line with Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 33 Wording and
context arguably provide a legal basis for supporting geoengineering or pursuing further

27. UNFCCC, supra note 23.
28. There are currently 194 parties to the UNFCCC. Parties to the Convention and Observer States,
UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/parties-and-observers/
parties/items/2352.php (last visited Jan. 27, 2011).
29. The United States is one of the major emitters and potential geoengineering states but not party to the
Kyoto Protocol. We do not address the question of whether geoengineering activities could qualify for credits
under the flexible mechanisms under Articles 6, 12, and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol. See David Freestone &
Rosemary Rayfuse, Ocean Iron Fertilizationand InternationalLaw, 364 MARINE ECOLOGY PROGRESS SERIES
227, 231 (2008). See generally Christine Bertram, Ocean Iron Fertilization in the Context of the Kyoto
Protocoland the Post-Kyoto Process (Kiel Inst. for the World Econ., Working Paper No. 1523 2009).
30. Meaning the level of CO 2 in the atmosphere. All proponents of geoengineering acknowledge and stress
that it does not reduce anthropocentric CO 2 emissions levels as the underlying cause of climate change.
31. UNFCCC, supra note 23, at art. 3(3).
32. Freestone & Rayfuse, supra note 29, at 231; Bodansky, supra note 3, at 313.
33. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, openedfor signatureMay 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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geoengineering research, although it would be stretching the wording too far to read
Article 3(3) of the UNFCCC as actually requiring geoengineering measures. 34
The role of the precautionary principle in Article 3(3) of the UNFCCC in the
geoengineering debate remains ambiguous. Looking at the risks of geoengineering and
the potential consequences in isolation, the precautionary principle is an argument
against geoengineering because of its unclear and potentially severe and unpredictable
consequences. On the other hand, looking at the risks posed by climate change, and
assuming a low probability of reducing emissions quickly and effectively, the
precautionary principle could be used to call for and legitimize further geoengineering
research. In that sense, the precautionary principle embodies the core arguments both for
and against geoengineering.
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT ("EIA")

A further general rule is the duty to carry out an environmental impact assessment.
The ICJ has recently recognized that the accepted practice amongst states amounted to "a
requirement under general international law to undertake an environmental impact
assessment where there is a risk that the proposed industrial activity may have a
significant adverse impact in a transboundary context, in particular, on a shared
resource." 35 While the ICJ left it to the states to determine the specific content of the
impact assessment required, it did clarify that it involves "having regard to the nature and
magnitude of the proposed development and its likely adverse impact on the
environment as well as to the need to exercise due diligence in conducting such an
assessment." 36 In addition, the ICJ added further details to the obligation: The impact
assessment must be carried out prior to the implementation of the activity, and
continuous monitoring of the activity's effect on the environment is required. This may
seem obvious from the point of view of scientific standards and good practice, but as a
legal rule in customary international law it is an important development, particularly in
light of the continuous monitoring requirement. The requirement to carry out an
environmental impact assessment is customary international law and applies even in the
absence of a treaty obligation to this effect. This is not the case for strategic impact
assessment ("SEA"). However, Article 14(l)(b) of the CBD provides a near-global
obligation in this regard and the CBD COP has developed guidelines for its
implementation.38
The EnvironmentalModification Convention? ("ENMOD Convention")
The ENMOD Convention provides rules that appear to address concerns raised in

34. On the precautionary approach in this regard, see BIRNIE, BOYLE, & REDGWELL, supra note 22, at 162,
164.
35. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, 1 204.
36. Id. 1205.
37. Id.
38. See CBD DecisionVI/7, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20 at 93. The UNECE Espoo Convention has a
Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment, UNECE Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment to
the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, May 21, 2003, U.N. Doc
ECE/MP.EIA/2003/2.
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relation to geoengineering. The Convention was a reaction to deliberate attempts at
weather modification by the United States during the Vietnam War 39 and was intended
to restrict such means of warfare. Article II of the ENMOD provides a broad definition
of environmental modification techniques, including "any technique for changing through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes - the dynamics, composition
or structure of the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or
of outer space."40 The definition appears to apply to geoengineering, in particular as an
interpretative understanding to Article II ENMOD explicitly lists changes in climate
patterns.41 Against this background, it is tempting to apply ENMOD to geoengineering
or to use it as a model for future regulation.
However, the ENMOD Convention is part of the international law of armed
conflict and applies only to military or any other hostile use of environmental
modification techniques. It clearly distinguishes armed conflict and peaceful purposes.
The text and the interpretative notes explicitly clarify that the Convention is without
prejudice to the use for peaceful purposes.42 There is no indication in the text or in the
negotiating history that a state is free to regard the use of certain techniques as "hostile"
and to invoke the ENMOD Convention when the threshold to an armed conflict is not
crossed. Although it can be difficult to determine which situations constitute an armed
conflict and to invoke the special body of law attached to it, the distinction between the
law applying in peacetime and the law of armed conflict remains crucial. Applying the
ENMOD Convention in peacetime on the basis of a subjectively determined "hostile"
use would erode this distinction and introduce a grey area between the two areas of law.
Although not directly applicable, the ENMOD Convention could provide ideas and
concepts useful for addressing geoengineering. For instance, it provides a definition of
deliberate environmental modification and criteria for determining widespread, longlasting or severe effects. It also envisages an interesting concept for dispute resolution
through a complaint procedure to the Security Council of the United Nations.43 Given
the potential global effects and political implications, this might be worth considering in
the context of geoengineering.44
However, consideration of the ENMOD Convention as a model must take into
account that participation is limited45 and the rules have not been applied in practice.46
On the other hand, some key states that have engaged in weather modification or

39. See Weather Modification: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Oceans and Int'l Env't of the Comm. on
ForeignRelations, 93rd Cong. 30-31, 53, 77, 88-123 (1974).
40. ENMOD, supra note 6, at art. 11.
41. The understandings regarding the convention are not part of the treaty but are part of the negotiating
record and were included in the report of the negotiating Committee to the United Nations General Assembly.
42. ENMOD, supra note 6, at preamble, art. III; Bodansky, supra note 3, at 311.
43. ENDMOD, supra note 6, at art. V, paras. 3-6.
44. Id. at art. V(3)-(6).
45. It has 74 parties, of which only few have acceded in recent years. Status of Treaties, United Nations
Treaty Collection, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsaspx?src
UNTSONLINE&tabid=1&mtdsg no=XXVl- 1&chapter-26&lang-en. (last accessed Jan. 28, 2011).
46. For instance, the ENMOD Convention was not invoked for the burning of oil fields by Iraq in the 1991
Gulf War, because Iraq had not ratified it. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENsE, Report to Congress on the Conduct of
the Persian Gulf War--Appendix on the Role of the Law of War (Apr. 10, 1992), reprinted in 31 1.L.M. 612
(1992).
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geoengineering experiments, or that may have the interest and the capacity to engage in
geoengineering in the future, are parties to the ENMOD Convention, for example: Brazil,
China, India, Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia.
The CBD COP] 0 Decisions on Geoengineering
One particular geoengineering concept, ocean fertilization, has been addressed in
detail by the treaty bodies of the LC/LP and the CBD, as well as by the United Nations
General Assembly. 47 The legal implications of these statements and decisions as well as
the LOHAFEX experiment carrying out ocean fertilization in 2009 have been discussed
elsewhere. 48 In October 2010, CBD COPlO in Nagoya, Japan, went beyond ocean
fertilization and adopted a decision addressing geoengineering in general.
CBD COPl0 mainly drew attention because of the adopted "package" containing
49
the ABS Protocol and decisions on the Strategic Plan and resource mobilization.
However, it also dealt with geoengineering under the agenda items "biodiversity and
50
climate change," "marine and coastal biodiversity," and "new and emerging issues.',
The decision adopted by COP10 on biodiversity and climate change51 is remarkable,
most notably because it expands the CBD's scope of interest and addresses
geoengineering as a general concept. The decision was based on a draft by the Subsidiary
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice ("SBSTA") and consultations at
COP 10.52 It builds and expands on the CBD's previous decision on ocean fertilization. 53
In paragraph 8 of the decision on biodiversity and climate change, the COP
Invites Parties and other Governments, according to national circumstance and priorities, as
well as relevant organizations and processes, to consider the guidance below on ways to
conserve, sustainably use and restore biodiversity and ecosystem services while
contributing to climate-change mitigation and adaptation.54
This chapeau is followed by a long list of items and subject matters, with the guidance on
geoengineering provided by two subparagraphs under the subheading "Reducing the
55
impacts of climate change on biodiversity and biodiversity-based livelihoods."

47. See G.A. Res 62/215, para. 97-98, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/215 (Mar. 14, 2008). See also G.A. Res
63/111, paras. 115-116, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/111 (Feb. 12, 2009); G.A. Res 64/71, paras. 132-33, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/64/71 (Mar. 12, 2010); G.A. Res 65/137, paras. 132-33, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/37 (draft doc. A/65/L.20
adopted).
48. See Freestone & Rayfuse, supra note 29, at 227-33; Harald Ginzky, Ocean Fertilization as Climate
Change Mitigation Measure - ConsiderationUnder InternationalLaw 7 J. FOR EUROPEAN ENvTL & PLAN. L.
57-58 (2010); Philomene Verlaan, Geo-engineering,the Law of the Sea, and Climate Change, 3 CARBON &
CLIMATE L. REv. 446 (2009).

49. See CBD Decision X/1, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/1 (Oct. 29, 2010); CBD Decision X/2,
(Oct. 29, 2010); CBD Decision X/3, U.N. DOC.
U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/2
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/3 (Oct. 29, 2010).
50 See List of Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological
Diversity at Its Tenth Meeting, available at http://www.cbd.int/copl0/doc/.
51. CBD Decision X/33, supra note 15.
52. See Draft Decisions for the Tenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on
Biological Diversity, item 5.6, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/10/1/Add.2/Rev.1 (Oct. 1, 2010). See also Report
of Working Group I, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/10/L.1/Add.l (Oct. 28, 2010).
53. CBD Decision lI16, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/IX/16 (Oct. 9,2008).
54. CBD Decision X/33, supranote 15, at para. 8 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at para. 2.
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Subparagraph 8(x) refers to the COP's previous decision on ocean fertilization 56 and the
work of the LC/LP. Subparagraph 8(w) goes beyond this previous focus and provides
"guidance" on geoengineering as a general concept:
Ensure, in line and consistent with decision IX/16 C,on ocean fertilization and biodiversity
and climate change, in the absence of science based, global, transparent and effective
control and regulatory mechanisms for geo-engineering, and in accordance with the
precautionary approach and Article 14 of the Convention, that no climate-related geoengineering activities that may affect biodiversity take place, until there is an adequate
scientific basis on which to justify such activities and appropriate consideration of the
associated risks for the environment and biodiversity and associated social, economic and
cultural impacts, with the exception of small scale scientific research studies that would be
conducted in a controlled setting in accordance with Article 3 of the Convention, and only
if they are justified by the need to gather specific scientific data and are subject to a
thorough prior assessment of the potential impacts on the environment.

The words "make sure" and "ensure" in subparagraphs 8(w) and 8(x) usually
signify clear legal obligations.58 However, there is no legal restriction on
geoengineering. The language of the chapeau of paragraph 8 merely "invites" parties and
other governments "to consider" the COP's guidance contained in the following
subparagraphs (see above). Further flexibility is provided by the qualifiers "according to
national circumstances and priorities."59 The question of whether and to what extent a
COP decision under the CBD could impose binding obligations on parties does not arise.
It remains to be seen whether the decision amounts to a de facto moratorium, as some
have claimed. 60
Despite the absence of a legal obligation, this "guidance" is important in several
respects. First, the COP addresses geoengineering in general. On the basis of the broad
mandate given to the COP in Article 23.4(i) of the CBD,61 the decision refers to all
climate-related geo-engineering activities that may affect biodiversity. The phrase "that
may affect biodiversity"62 redundantly appears both in the definition and in the operative
part of the decision. Previous drafts of the friends of the chair-group had required that the
activity "substantially" affect biodiversity.63 The text adopted by the COP links
geoengineering to biodiversity in the broadest possible sense that the COP's mandate
permits under the CBD and would probably cover all concepts currently discussed under
the heading "geoengineering." This is a remarkable policy signal, considering there
appear to be no current large-scale field experiments apart from the LOHAFEX ocean

56. Id. at sec. C, Ocean Fertilization.
57. Id. at para. 8(w) (footnote omitted).
58. Id at paras. 8(w)-8(x).
59. Id.at para. 8.
60. Recent MEA Activities, MEA BULL. (Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev. (IISD) - Reporting Servs. Div.),
Nov. 1, 2010, at 1, available at http://www.iisd.calmea-1/meabulletinlO3.pdf.
61. Under Art. 23.4(i) CBD, the COP has the mandate to "[c]onsider and undertake any additional action
that may be required for the achievement of the purposes of this Convention in the light of experience gained in
its operation." Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 4, at art. 23.4(i).
62. CBD Decision X/33, supra note 15, at para. 8(w).
63. On file with the author.
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fertilization experiment in 2009.64 States are only beginning to consider how to approach
geoengineering and whether to define a policy on it. However, further research on
potential "emergency tools" is being discussed in the scientific community, and the
debate on directing further research has reached policymakers and the public. 65
Definition of Geoengineering
The decision also provides a tentative definition of geoengineering in a footnote to
the operative text.66 This is a logical consequence of giving the guidance its broad scope.
The decision also marked the first time that states provided a definition of
geoengineering in the international formal setting of a COP and in the form of a COP
decision. In view of its purpose as guidance, the definition deserves a closer look:
Without prejudice to future deliberations on the definition of geo-engineering activities,
understanding that any technologies that deliberately reduce solar insolation [sic] or
increase carbon sequestration from the atmosphere on a large scale that may affect
biodiversity (excluding carbon capture and storage from fossil fuels when it captures
carbon dioxide before it is released into the atmosphere) should be considered as forms of
geo-engineering which are relevant to the Convention on Biological Diversity until a more
precise definition can be developed. Noting that solar insolation is defined as a measure of
solar radiation energy received on a given surface area in a given hour and that carbon
sequestration is defined as the process of increasing the carbon content of a reservoir/pool
other than the atmosphere. 67
The definition builds on previous work by academic and scientific institutions and
includes both solar radiation management ("SRM") and carbon dioxide removal
("CDR") techniques. 6 8
The terms "deliberately" and "large-scale" are two key elements of the definition.
The reference to "deliberate" is an attempt to distinguish geoengineering concepts
currently discussed from other activities that reduce solar insolation; for instance,
emissions that have cumulative global effects. However, it remains to be seen whether

64. See Yu. A. Izrael et al., FieldStudies of a Geo-engineeringMethod of Maintaininga Modern Climate
With Aerosol Particles, 34 RUSSIAN METEOROLOGY AND HYDROLOGY 635 (2009) (reporting a recent smallscale SRM experiment). An SRM experiment in the context of the SPICE project planned for October 2011 has
recently been postponed to allow time
for more engagement with stakeholders,
see
http://www.epsrc.ac.uk/newsevents/news/2011 /Pages/spiceupdate.aspx.
65. See The Asilomar Conference Recommendations on Principlesfor Research into Climate Engineering
Techniques:
Conference
Report,
CLIMATE
INST.,
Nov.
2010,
available
at
http://www.climate.org/PDF/AsilomarConferenceReport.pdf See also Asilomar International Conference on
Climate Intervention Technologies: Minimizing the Potential Risk of Research to Counter-balance Climate
Changeand its Impacts, CLIMATE RESPONSE FUND, http://www.climateresponsefund.org/index.php?option

=com content&view-article&id=87&ltemid=91

(last visited Jan. 29, 2011) (agenda and materials related to

the Asilomar Conference). See generally ELI KINTISCH, HACK THE PLANET: SCIENCE'S BEST HOPE - OR
WORST NIGHTMARE - FOR AVERTING CLIMATE CATASTROPHE (2010); JEFF GOODELL, HOw TO COOL THE
PLANET: GEOENGINEERING AND THE AUDACIOUS QUEST TO Fix EARTH'S CLIMATE (2010); Juliet Eilperin

Threat of Global Warming Sparks US. Interest in Geoengineering, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2010,
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/03/AR2010100303437.html; Lift-off, ECONOMIST,
Nov. 4, 2010, at 91, also available at www.economist.com/node/17414216.
66. CBD Decision X/33, supranote 15, at para. 8(w), n.3.
67. Id.
68.

ROYAL SoC'Y, supra note 15 (the two main concepts discussed as "geoengineering" are SRM and

CDR).
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the requirement of "deliberate" will be helpful in future governance efforts. For instance,
would the exclusion of non-deliberate large-scale effects prejudice potential state
responsibility by affecting the "due diligence" standard that is part of the customary
obligation not to cause transboundary environmental harm? Would the definition cover
weather modification activities carried out by states that intend to change regional
precipitation without changing global solar insolation? In addition, reforestation and
afforestation appear to fall under the definition and would have to be justified under the
operative part in order to be excluded from the intended moratorium.
A further element of the definition is that the effects in question have to be "on a
large scale."69 Like "deliberately," this element of the definition is exclusive rather than
inclusive. Many technologies and activities - perhaps even deliberately - will to some
extent reduce solar insolation or increase CO 2 sequestration from the atmosphere, but on
a scale that is considered either negligible from a global perspective or acceptable for the
time being. The definition seeks to exclude such activities. The "large scale" element
seems to be at odds with the operative part of the guidance, which excludes small-scale
scientific research studies. As such studies would not fit the definition of geoengineering
in the first place, the exclusion in the operative part seems redundant. Perhaps the
drafters of the decision and the states adopting it wanted to be sure not to stifle scientific
research. The question remains by which standard or from which point of view the "large
scale" is to be determined.
The definition also explicitly excludes Carbon Capture and Storage ("CCS"), a
technology that is probably the most advanced in practical terms of all geoengineering
concepts. Whether equivalent standards and safeguards envisaged by the decision for
other types of geoengineering are in place for CCS is a question not addressed here. 70
The geological storage problems for CO 2 captured from the air are the same as for

CCS. 71

The CBD acknowledges shortcomings of the definition by mentioning its
provisional nature twice. It is "without prejudice to future deliberations" and applies only
"until a more precise definition is found." 72 However, the elements of this definition are
not new and it is doubtful whether progress will be made in finding a "more precise"
definition. A definition would have to address, inter alia, whether the scale of the
activity and the intention of states can be useful criteria in distinguishing geoengineering
from other climate-related activities. The decision highlights the problem of covering in
one definition a range of different concepts that do not easily lend themselves to
threshold values. The term "geoengineering" is generic, a general label that covers a
wide range of approaches and concepts that are intended to address global warming
69. CBD Decision X/33, supranote 15, at para. 8(w), n.3.
70. The parties to the LP adopted amendments to the LP allowing the export of CO 2 Streams for disposal
into sub-seabed geological formations. See LC/LP, Resolution LP.1(1) on the Amendment to Include CO 2
Sequestration in Sub-seabed Geological Formations in Annex 1 to the London Protocol, Nov. 2, 2006,
[hereinafter Resolution LP.1(1)]; LC/LP, Resolution LP.3(4) on the Amendment to Article 6 of the London
Protocol, Oct. 30, 2009 [hereinafter Resolution LP.3(4)].
71. Bart Gordon, Engineering the climate research needs and strategies for international coordination: Staff
report, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives (Washington, DC, 2010), p. 21;
ROYAL SOC'Y, supra note 15, at 20. For differences, see id. at 20.
72. CBD Decision X/33, supranote 15, at para. 8(w), n.3.
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without reducing emissions.
The Operative Part
Based on the definition of geoengineering, the core of the operative part of
paragraph 8(w) is the guidance "that no climate-related geo-engineering activities that
may affect biodiversity take place." 7 3 It is part of one sentence that is almost ten lines
long and contains several qualifiers, conditions, and exceptions.
The qualifier "climate-related" seems redundant and its purpose is not clear.
Against the background of the definition, which requires the deliberate application of
technologies on a large scale, it is difficult to imagine such solar radiation management
or carbon dioxide removal technologies that would not be climate-related. Moreover, if
there were such technologies not related to climate, they could still affect biodiversity. It
is not clear why the CBD would seek to restrain only climate-related geoengineering.
Although the language is not entirely clear and the grammar allows for different
interpretations, it appears that the intended restriction of geoengineering in paragraph
8(w) is subject to three exceptions.
First, the whole operative part is worded as a transitional measure. Paragraph 8(w)
is based on the explicit proviso that there are no science-based, global, transparent and
effective control and regulatory mechanisms in place for geoengineering. One
mechanism fulfilling the criteria of this general exception could be the LC/LP
Assessment Framework for scientific research involving ocean fertilization, adopted just
before CBD COP 10 by the parties to the London Convention/London Protocol. 74 This is
discussed below.
The phrase, "and in accordance with the precautionary approach and Article 14 of
the Convention" is not linked to the preceding phrase on control and regulatory
mechanisms. 75 The requirement, "in accordance with" does not fit together with the
proviso "in the absence of' regulatory mechanisms. 76 Instead, it would seem that this
part is meant to explain that the intended restriction of geoengineering is adopted on the
basis of, and justified by, the precautionary approach and Article 14 of the CBD, which
deals with impact assessment and minimizing adverse impacts. 77 The reference does not
qualify or change the operative part.
In addition to this general exception, paragraph 8(w) provides for two further
exceptions, which appear to allow for geoengineering in the absence of control and
regulatory mechanisms.
The second exception applies generally to activities for which there is an "adequate
scientific basis" and for which "appropriate consideration" is given to the "associated
risks for the environment and biodiversity and associated social, economic and cultural
impacts."

It is not clear whether "adequate scientific basis" means that the concept

73. Id. at para. 8(w).
74. LC/LP, Resolution LC-LP.2 (2010) on the Assessment Framework for Research Involving Ocean
Fertilisation, Oct. 14, 2010 [hereinafter LC-LP.2 (2010)].
75. CBD Decision X/33, supranote 15, at para. 8(w).
76. Id. at para. 8(w), n.3.
77. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 4, at art. 14.
78. CBD Decision X/33, supranote 15, at para. 8(w).

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2010

13

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 46 [2010], Iss. 2, Art. 4
318

TULSA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 46:305

behind the particular activity must be based on science, whether the request to conduct
the activity must come from scientists, whether the activity must be managed or
conducted by scientists, or whether the risk must be manageable from a scientific point
of view.
The third exception applies specifically to small-scale scientific research studies
conducted in a controlled setting in accordance with Article 3 of the CBD. This provision
reiterates the duty to prevent transboundary environmental harm in Principle 2 of the
1992 Rio Declaration, which was discussed above. 79 In the context of paragraph 8(w),
the reference to Article 3 CBD could simply reaffirm this general customary obligation.
Another interpretation could be that any small-scale research studies would have to be
conducted in areas within the jurisdiction or control of Parties to the CBD. This intention
was clearer in an earlier draft during CBD COPlO, which required that the studies be
conducted "in a controlled setting within national jurisdiction[s] bearing in mind Article
3" of the CBD. However, the fact that this wording was changed arguably indicates that
the decision merely reiterates the general customary rule. The drafting history is
inconclusive and, again, the decision's language is ambiguous.
Paragraph 8(w) ends with the further requirement that "they" are justified by the
need to gather specific scientific data and are subject to a thorough prior assessment of
the potential impacts on the environment.80 If "they" only referred to the small scale
activities under the third exception, it would render this exception narrower than the
second exception. In other words, the requirements for an exception for small scale
studies would be stricter than the requirements for geoengineering activities in general,
which appears incongruous. Thus, the last part beginning with "they" arguably refers to
"geoengineering activities" falling under the second exception. As a result, the
requirements regarding scientific justification and impact assessment seem partly
duplicative. To this extent, the meaning of this phrase remains unclear.
THE LC/LP ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

Before CBD COPl0, ocean fertilization was the only geoengineering concept
addressed as such at an international regulatory level, namely by the CBD and the
LC/LP.81 With regard to this particular geoengineering concept, CBD COP 10 reaffirmed
the precautionary approach and provided guidance to parties with a view towards
ensuring that no ocean fertilization takes place unless in accordance with Decision
IX/16C.82 The COP continued its previous approach of linking to the work under the
LC/LP and invited Parties and other Governments to act in accordance with
resolution LC-LP.2 (2010).83 In this resolution, the LC/LP had just before CBD COP10
79. The first part of Article 3 of the CBD and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration also provide that states
have the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental
policies. This part is of little relevance for paragraph 8(w) of the CBD COPl0 decision. See Convention on
Biological Diversity, supra note 4.
80. CBD Decision X/33, supra note 15, at para. 8(w).
81. See generally Freestone & Rayfuse, supra note 29; Verlaan, supranote 48; Ginzky, supra note 48.
82. CBD Decision X/29, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/29, paras. 13, 57-62 (Oct. 29, 2010),
available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-10/cop-10-dec-29-en.pdf.; CBD Decision X/33, supra note
15, at para. 8(x).
83. CBD Decision X/29, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/X/29 at para. 60.
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adopted an assessment framework for scientific research involving ocean fertilization
84
("LC/LP Assessment Framework").
The LC/LP Assessment Framework does not constitute a regulatory and control
mechanism that would exempt ocean fertilization under the general exception of
paragraph 8(w) of the CBD COPlO decision on geoengineering. In the resolution
adopting the LC/LP Assessment Framework, the parties affirm that the LC/LP should
continue to work towards providing a global, transparent, and effective control and
regulatory mechanism for ocean fertilization and other activities. This indicates that the
parties to the LC/LP do not regard the LC/LP Assessment Framework as a fully-fledged
mechanism as described by paragraph 8(w) of the CBD COPl0 decision on
geoengineering.
However, small-scale studies on ocean fertilization could fall under the third
exception under paragraph 8(w) of the CBD COP 10 decision regarding small-scale
research. For ocean fertilization activities on a larger scale, the LC/LP Assessment
Framework could meet the requirements of the second exception. First, the LC/LP
Assessment Framework arguably provides adequate scientific basis on which to justify
ocean fertilization activities. It is the explicit purpose of the LC/LP Assessment
Framework to determine whether a project is legitimate scientific research,85 and the
framework's process is geared towards scrutinizing the project's scientific method and
merit.86
The LC/LP Assessment Framework arguably also provides for appropriate
consideration of the associated risks for the environment and biodiversity and associated
social, economic, and cultural impacts. Its iterative structure provides detailed guidance
on an environmental assessment that includes biodiversity.87 It is based on an assessment
of potential exposure and effects and leads to a characterization of the risks involved,
including a description of the uncertainties associated with its conclusions. 88
Social, economic, and cultural effects are explicitly and implicitly addressed in
several paragraphs as part of the environmental assessment.89 Relevant information to be
provided includes "other considerations" such as proximity to other uses of the sea, for
example, fishing, navigation, engineering uses, areas of special concern and value, and
traditional uses of the sea. 90 Further considerations include unintended impacts of the
delivery method and conflicts of the delivery method with other legitimate uses of the
sea and human health considerations, including food chain effects.92 The effects
84. LC-LP.2(2010), supra note 74. See also LC/LP, Report of the Thirty-Second Consultative Meeting and
the Fifth Meeting of Contracting Parties, LC 32/15, 57, Nov. 9, 2010, available at
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/cclp/pdf/Protocoll5.pdf (for the Assessment Framework, see the draft elaborated by the
Scientific Group of the London Protocol)..
85. LC/LP, Assessment Framework for Scientific Research Involving Ocean Fertilization, para. 1.2, Oct.
14, 2010, available at http://www.whoi.edulfileserver.do?id=70484&pt-10&p=39373 (last visited Jan. 20,
2011) [hereinafter Assessment Framework].
86. See, e.g., id. at paras. 1.2, 1.3, 2.2.
87. Id. at paras. 3.4, 3.4.2.3.
88. Id. at paras. 3.3.1, 3.5.13.
89. LC-LP.2(2010), supra note 74.
90. Assessment Framework, supra note 85, at para. 3.2.4.6 (in the context of "establishing both the
Experimental Baseline and the Risk Assessment Baseline conditions and their variability").
91. Id at para. 3.3.3.7 (technical considerations as part of the exposure assessment).
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assessment should address "short- and long-term primary production changes, leading to
impacts to fisheries or protected species, or other social impacts including visual
amenity." The risk characterization includes hazards to navigation and restriction of
fishing grounds. 93 In addition, the framework envisages a consultation process with all
stakeholders before a final decision is made. 94 The sum of these elements arguably
constitutes appropriate consideration of associated social, economic, and cultural
impacts.
The LC/LP Assessment Framework is not legally binding in form or in wording. In
addition, participation in the LC/LP is not comparable to, for instance, the CBD or the
UNFCCC in terms of number of parties. 95 However, the CBD decision does not require
binding or global rules for the second exception to apply. Ocean fertilization activities
conducted in line with the LC/LP Assessment Framework would not be contrary to
paragraph 8(w) of the CBD decision on biodiversity and climate change.
FURTHER WORK

The CBD COP has outlined further work on geoengineering, inviting submissions
from parties and requesting further work from the Executive Secretary. In particular, the
CBD requested a study on gaps in existing regulatory mechanisms for climate-related
geo-engineering relevant to the Convention on Biological Diversity, bearing in mind that
such mechanisms may not be best placed under the Convention on Biological
Diversity.96 The LC/LP also works towards establishing a global control and regulatory
mechanism for ocean fertilization activities. 97 The debate within the science community
continues98 and geoengineering and its potential effects will also be part of the IPCC's
fifth assessment report, including the possible role, options, risks, and status of
geoengineering as a response option.99
92. Id. at paras. 3.4.2.1, 3.4.2.2 (as part of the effects assessment).
93. Id. at para. 3.5.2.1.
94. Id. at para. 1.8.
95. There are 87 parties to the London Convention and 40 parties to the London Protocol as of November 8,
2011. See London Convention and London Protocol, INT'L MARITIME ORG., www.imo.org/OurWork/
Environment/SpecialProgrammesAndInitiatives/Pages/London-Convention-and-Protocol.aspx
(last visited
Nov. 8, 2011). The parties represent about two thirds and one third of global merchant shipping tonnage
respectively. See also Press Briefing, Int'l Maritime Org., Assessment Framework for Scientific Research
Involving
Ocean
Fertilization
Agreed,
(Oct.
20,
2010),
available
at
www.imo.org/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/Assessment-Framework-for-scientific-research-involvingocean-fertilization-agreed.aspx.
96. See CBD Decision X/13, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/13, para. 4 (Oct. 29, 2010), availableat
http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-1 0/cop- 10-dec-I 3-en.pdf.; CBD Decision X/33, supra note 15, at paras.
9(l)-(m). See also CBD Decision X/29, supra note 82, at paras. 57-62. The studies will be available at
http://www.cbd.int/climate/geoengineering/.
97. LC-LP.2(2010), supra note 74, at 3.
98. See generally Mark New et al., Four Degrees and Beyond: The Potentialfor a Global Temperature
Increase ofFourDegrees and its Implications, 369 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL Soc'Y A 6, 16 (2011);
Aaron Strong et al., Ocean Fertilization:Time to Move On, 461 NATURE 347, 347-348 (2009); Bertram, supra
note 29, at 3.
99. Int'l Panel on Climate Change, Scope, Content and Process for the Preparation of the Synthesis Report
(SYR) of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), (Oct.
14, 2010), available at
www.ipcc.ch/meetings/session32/docO4p32_contprocessSYR.pdf. In June 2011 the IPCC convened a Joint
IPCC Expert Meeting of WGI, WGII, and WGIII on geo-engineering, see http://www.ipccwg3.de/meetings/expert-meetings-and-workshops/em-geo-engineering.
See generally INT'L PANEL ON
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CONCLUSIONS

The rules and principles identified above form the core of current international law
applicable to geoengineering in general. As customary law or as part of the UNFCCC,
they must comply with all relevant subjects of international law irrespective of the
particular geoengineering technique. Although general in nature, the minimum rules
analyzed above are on a solid legal footing and politically reflect states' legitimate
expectations. They are common legal ground, but would be an incomplete basis for
international governance and cooperation. Even in combination with international law
applicable to specific geoengineering concepts, the existing rules are unlikely to be able
to contain the risks posed by geoengineering or be able to avoid related political
conflicts.
All applicable rules identified above include science and research without being
specifically designed for these activities, and they do not distinguish between research
and deployment. In terms of the risks involved, it is suggested that it is not necessary to
introduce this distinction at a regulatory level. The borderline between research
experiments and deployment becomes artificial once a certain scale is reached. Below
that scale, the general rules do not require states to impose an unreasonable restriction on
scientific research.
The CBD COPlO decision on geoengineering took the previous work by the
LC/LP and the CBD a significant step further from addressing ocean fertilization to
addressing geoengineering in general. It is not binding in form or language, but it sends a
political signal and crystallizes the debate about the conditions that should apply to
further geoengineering activities.
Legal problems arise when geoengineering is brought into the general political and
regulatory sphere. The CBD decision text on geoengineering is a delicate balance
between different views, and the wording and definition could be more precise and
consistent. The CBD COPlO decision also raises the question of different treaties or
institutions potentially competing for addressing geoengineering with overlapping or
inconsistent rules or guidance.1 00 In legal terms, the mandate of the CBD COP is
sufficiently broad for it to justify addressing all geoengineering concepts relevant to
biodiversity. The same goes for the mandate of other major treaty regimes, notably the
UNFCCC/KP, which so far has not addressed this issue. In this context it is worth noting
that the International Maritime Organization ("IMO") information on recent LC/LP
activities states that the LC/LP parties "have declared themselves the competent
internationalbodies to regulate legitimate scientific research into ocean fertilization and
to prohibit commercial activities in this field." 10 1 Yet from a global perspective, the
CLIMATE CHANGE, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 797, 803-04 (M.L. Parry et al. eds., 2007) (mentioning
geoengineering); INT'L PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 624-625 (B. Metz et al.

eds., 2007) (mentioning geoengineering).
100. Cf Scott, supra note 3, at 10 (on marine issues). See generally Karen N. Scott, Conflation of and
Conflict Between, Regulatory Mandates: Managing the FragmentationofInternationalEnvironmentalLaw in
a Globalised World, THIRD FOUR Soc'Ys CONFERENCE: INT'L LAW IN THE NEW ERA OF GLOBALIZATION

(Aug. 26-28, 2010).
101. LC-LP.2 (2010), supranote 74, at 3 (emphasis added).
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different regimes and institutions have different legal and political weight, depending, for
instance, on their respective levels of participation.102
Even though most geoengineering concepts are only at an abstract or modeling
stage, there are reasons for exploring and considering rules and governance models that
include research activities. First, the mere potential for transboundary impacts even at an
early (field testing) stage could have serious foreign policy implications and entail the
risk that other nations may hold the researching or deploying state responsible for alleged
impacts. Second, the public debate could become framed in terms of outright rejection or
support, which could eventually polarize and divide the science community and public
opinion in a way similar to the broader debate on climate change. Third, depending on
the particular technique, research and experiments are likely to require coordination at
the international level in order to attribute data to particular experiments and ensure valid
results. Neither the existing legal rules nor the principles proposed by parts of the
scientific community seem adequate to address these concerns.

102. For instance, the United States is party to the London Convention, but not the London Protocol or the
CBD. However, the United States did vote in favor of the UN GA resolutions, which welcomed and took note
of the LC/LP and CBD activities.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol46/iss2/4

18

